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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Note: The purpose of this summary is to provide the judges
with a concise explanation of the issues and the possible arguments. To best effect this purpose, citations have been
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omitted from this summary. Please refer to the main portion
of the judge's bench memorandum for all citations.
The first issue which the court will face is whether CERCLA may be used to recover costs incurred in cleaning up
property contaminated by actions taken prior to the enactment of CERCLA. If CERCLA cannot be applied to this case,
the remainder of the issues become moot and the decision of
the lower court must be reversed. As the following discussion
will illustrate, CERCLA may be applied retroactively in this
case.
The court must determine the proper test for ascertaining whether a retroactive application of a statute is permissible. The Supreme Court decision in Landgraf v. USI Film
Products has set forth a three-part test which must be satisfied in order to apply a statute to pre-enactment conduct.
Although the Southern District of Alabama has claimed in
United States v. Olin that Landgraf alters the test used by
prior courts in CERCLA cases, this rationale is without
merit.
In order for a statute to be applied retroactively in the
absence of an express authorization, a court must first decide
if a retroactive application is necessary. If so, the court must
apply the traditional presumption against retroactivity unless the statute is immune to this presumption because it
confers or ousts jurisdiction or is merely procedural. If the
presumption applies, the court must find clear evidence of
Congress's intent to permit a retroactive application of the
statute. This evidence can come from either the language of
the statute, the legislative history, or a combination of the
two.
In the present case, the requirements of the test are met
and CERCLA may be applied. First, CERCLA will be applied
retroactively in this case since the conduct which has caused
the contamination occurred before CERCLA was passed.
Since CERCLA is not one of the types of statutes normally
immune to the presumption against retroactivity, the presumption must be rebutted.

7
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Several statutory provisions as well as the legislative
history work to rebut the presumption. First, § 107(f) specifically states that CERCLA may not be used to recover damages to natural resources where the conduct causing the
damage predates the enactment of CERCLA. Although a
similar negative implication argument was rejected by the
Supreme Court in Landgraf,the two provisions considered in
Landgraf were, by the Court's own admission, minor provisions related to very specific situations. Such is not the case
here. Another section of CERCLA which provides evidence of
congressional intent is § 103(c) which requires owners and
operators who disposed of hazardous substances or accepted
such substances for transport to notify EPA within six
months of enactment. The most natural use for this information would be to locate sites which potentially require
cleanup, the cost of which would be recovered under CERCLA. Third, the statute uses the past tense when referring to
owners and operators and the activities which resulted in the
contamination. Finally, the legislative history makes reference to CERCLA's purpose of providing authority for the
cleanup of abandoned or inactive hazardous waste sites. It is
unlikely that Congress meant for the EPA to sit around and
wait for sites to become inactive or abandoned rather than
cleaning up problem sites that already existed.
All the above factors work together to demonstrate that
Congress meant for CERCLA to apply to contamination
caused by pre-enactment conduct. Thus, CERCLA may be
applied in this case. Since the statute imposes only a monetary burden on the parties who created the contamination,
CERCLA need only satisfy the rational basis test in order to
pass constitutional muster under the Due Process clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
The second issue to be decided is whether applying CERCLA in this case would exceed Congress's authority under the
Commerce Clause. In United States v. Lopez, the Court
stated that Congress can regulate activities which substantially affect interstate commerce, even if those activities are
purely local in nature. Although the Southern District of Alabama in United States v. Olin has interpreted Lopez as sig-
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naling a sharp curtailment of Congress's powers under the
Commerce Clause, this interpretation is unfounded. In the
present case, CERCLA is regulating industries which dispose
of or transport hazardous waste. Although a single incident
may not affect interstate commerce, adding together the effects of all disposals which result in contamination likely results in a major impact on interstate commerce.
The Supreme Court specifically reaffirmed its modern
Commerce Clause jurisprudence in Lopez. Thus, cases like
Wickard v. Filburn,which permitted regulation of local activities which would affect interstate commerce when all similar
activities where considered in the aggregate, are still good
law. Although the Lopez Court refused to uphold a statute
prohibiting the possession of a gun (undoubtedly an article of
commerce) in a school zone, the distinguishing factor of the
Lopez situation is the fact that the statute was criminal in
nature and regulated only the possession of the gun rather
than its sale or movement in interstate commerce. The situation here is quite different. Furthermore, although the Lopez
Court looked for a jurisdictional element with which to conduct a case-by-case inquiry of the statute's effect on interstate
commerce, such an element has only been necessary in criminal cases, not civil cases such as CERCLA cost recovery
actions.
In addition to determining whether the Lopez case has
had any effect on Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause, the court must also examine whether GUVS may be
sued under CERCLA in light of the Supreme Court decision
in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida which held that Congress cannot use the Commerce Clause to abrogate a state's
sovereign immunity. In Seminole, the Court decided that
Congress could not authorize suits by Indian tribes against a
state for the state's failure to bargain in good faith regarding
gaming on Indian lands. GUVS claims that the Seminole decision supports the proposition that GUVS should not be sued
under CERCLA since the school was created by the state.
However, the Attorney General of the State of New Union
has issued a legal opinion stating that GUVS is not an arm of
the state government. In light of this opinion and consider-

9
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ing the broad powers Congress has under the Commerce
Clause, GUVS's argument should be found to have no merit.
The third issue to be addressed is whether WUWPS, a
PRP by virtue of its present ownership of the contaminated
property, may bring a cost recovery action against GUVS, another PRP, or whether WUWPS may only bring a claim for
contribution. The resolution of this question will determine
whether WUWPS can escape liability for the orphan share of
another bankrupt PRP by imposing joint and several liability
on GUVS or whether WUWPS is limited to a contribution action which would allocate that orphan share equitably among
all PRPs.
Since CERCLA itself does not expressly address this issue and the Supreme Court has not decided the question, it is
necessary to determine Congress's intent from the language
of the statute and, if necessary, the legislative history. The
two main provisions to examine are the liability section,
§ 107, and the contribution section, § 113. Section 107 states
that "any other person [not a government or a Indian tribe]"
may bring a cost recovery action. There is no language indicating that the plaintiff must be an "innocent" party and
many courts have refused to infer such a requirement. On
the other hand, § 113 creates a claim for contribution and
contribution is generally used to allocate costs among two or
more liable parties.
Sections 107 and 113 can both be given effect by a ruling
that a plaintiff PRP who has not been ordered to clean up or
has not been formally found to be liable may bring a cost recovery action under § 107 subject to the defendant's right to
counterclaim under § 113. This is the situation here, where
WUWPS voluntarily undertook to clean up the contamination and should be rewarded for its diligence by avoiding liability for any orphan shares. This result best serves
CERCLA's purpose of cleaning up contaminated sites as
quickly and effectively as possible.
The final issue to be decided is whether SNUHSA may
recover the costs it has incurred in monitoring the Marinas
for adverse health effects due to the contamination. In order
to be recoverable under CERCLA, these medical monitoring
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costs must be "necessary costs of response." Such costs include "monitoring reasonably required" to protect public
health and welfare and any other actions to "prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare."
Although some cases allow recovery of medical monitoring
costs, most do not.
Several factors that support the proposition that medical
monitoring costs are not recoverable in this case. First,
§ 104(i) of CERCLA creates the Agency for Toxic Substances
and Disease Registry (ATSDR) which is given the task of performing medical monitoring on persons exposed to contamination. The ATSDR may undertake such monitoring on its
own or may act on a petition for monitoring. The fact that
medical monitoring is expressly provided for in this manner
strongly suggests that Congress did not intend to authorize
private causes of action for medical monitoring costs. In addition, the legislative history includes statements that a
cause of action for personal injuries was considered in the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) but
was ultimately deleted. Finally, since the contamination was
so localized, one cannot argue that the public health is in
jeopardy. Considering all these factors, it seems clear that
medical monitoring performed without the consent of the
ATSDR is not a recoverable cost under CERCLA. The result
should be the same whether the plaintiff is a private individual or a government agency such as SNUHSA.
In summary, the court should find that the application of
CERCLA to this case does not run afoul of the presumption
against retroactive application of a statute and is a proper
exercise of Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause.
The court should also permit WUWPS to sue under either
§ 107 or § 113. Finally, SHUHSA should not be able to recover the costs it has incurred in initiating a program of medical monitoring for the Marinas.
Sample Questions on the Retroactivity Issue
1. Explain what is meant by "retroactive" application of a
statute.
2. Why is retroactive application of a statute disfavored?

11
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3. Does permitting a retroactive application of a statute
comport with the constitutional ban on ex post facto laws?
4. What test has the Supreme Court used to determine if a
statute may be applied retroactively?
5. Is this test different from previous tests and what are
those differences?
6. If Congress has not specifically stated that a statute may
be applied retroactively, is even possible to find enough evidence to show a clear intent to permit retroactive application?
7. Is a retroactive application of CERCLA being sought
here, particularly in light of the fact that the contamination
of the land continued for several years after CERCLA was
enacted?
8. (If a party makes the argument that, since CERCLA specifically disallows a retroactive application to recover damages to natural resources, it is implied that other allowable
costs may be recovered even if the contamination resulted
from pre-enactment conduct) Has the Supreme Court specifically rejected in Landgrafthe negative implication argument
to demonstrate congressional intent of retroactive
application?
9. If Congress did not intent CERCLA to be applied to preenactment conduct, why was reference made to using CERCLA as a tool to clean up abandoned or inactive hazardous
waste sites if those sites existing immediately before enactment would be beyond CERCLA's reach?
10. Does the fact that there is very little useful legislative
history cut for or against retroactive application? One on
hand, Congress may have wanted the courts to use their equitable powers to apply CERCLA as fairly as possible. On the
other hand, perhaps Congress wanted the statute applied
only as written.
11. Does applying CERCLA to pre-enactment conduct violate Due Process? Why or why not?
Sample Questions on the Commerce Clause Issue
1. How broad are Congress's powers under the Commerce
Clause and has that power been enlarged or diminished over
the last decade or two?
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2. The Supreme Court has grouped acceptable regulation
under the Commerce Clause into three groups. Which group
does CERCLA fit in and why?
3. What relationship to commerce must the regulation
have?
4. What is an "economic activity" and is it necessary that
the regulated activity be an economic activity?
5. Give some examples of non-economic activities that
might fit into one of the Supreme Court's three categories.
6. Has the Supreme Court implicitly overruled any prior
cases in its Lopez decision?
7. The Olin court has concluded that Lopez requires that
Congress provide for a jurisdictional element to allow a caseby-case inquiry into whether the activity to be regulated is
within the commerce power. Is this conclusion supported by
the language in Lopez and what is that language?
8. In this case, what is the connection to interstate commerce which satisfies the Supreme Court's test in Lopez?
How can the test be satisfied when the Marinas were the only
ones affected and the contamination was so localized?
9. Since GUVS was created by the state of New Union and
funded by the state, is it protected from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity?
10. Does the Seminole case require closer scrutiny when the
entity being sued has a connection to state government even
if it is not a state agency itself?
Sample Questions on the Contribution/Cost Recovery Issue
1. That is the difference between a contribution action and a
cost recovery action under CERCLA? Does it matter which
action is used?
2. How is WUWPS liable under CERCLA since it has not
been formally ordered to clean up or sued by anyone else? If
WUWPS had been formally found liable, would your argument change?
3. Does the fact that Congress provided several defenses to
a cost recovery action indicate that not all PRPs were meant
to be held responsible for cleanup costs and, hence, were enti-
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tled to full recovery of any expenses they themselves
incurred?
4. Does the Supreme Court's apparent acceptance of a dual
recovery system in Key Tronic indicate a resolution of the
issue?
5. What did Congress mean when it stated in § 107 that
"any other person" could bring a cost recovery action? Is "any
other person" different from "any person"? What does this
difference mean?
6. Is the language of the statute dispositive of the issue or is
it necessary to look at the legislative history?
7. Is there one interpretation of the statute which would
produce the most harmonious result and would give effect to
the whole statute? What is this interpretation?
8. What interpretation of the statute best serves the purposes for which CERCLA was enacted?
Sample Questions on the Medical Monitoring Issue
1. What types of costs are generally recoverable under
CERCLA?
2. Are medical monitoring costs specifically mentioned anywhere in the statute?
3. If medical monitoring costs are not expressly covered,
what other language suggests that such costs are
recoverable?
4. Does the creation of the Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry under the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act support the argument that medical monitoring costs incurred by private individuals are not recoverable? Why or why not?
5. Is there anything in the legislative history which speaks
to the issue of whether medical monitoring costs are
recoverable?
6. Is the issue fact-sensitive, that is, are there any situations in which medical monitoring costs would be recoverable
even though such costs would not be recoverable in other situations? In what type of case could recovery of these costs be
justified? Are these facts present here?

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/12

14

1997]

BENCH MEMORANDUM

829

7. Should the courts take into consideration who the plaintiff is when deciding whether to award reimbursement for
medical monitoring costs? Why or why not?
8. Does the recovery of medical monitoring costs fit in with
the stated purposes for enacting CERCLA?
I.

MAY CERCLA BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY IN
THIS CASE?

The issue most logically addressed first by the court is
whether CERCLA may be applied retroactively in this case.
This challenge to the lower court's decision should be decided
first since a decision that CERCLA may not be applied to preenactment conduct will render the rest of the analysis unnecessary. Furthermore, this issue should be addressed before
the Commerce Clause argument because a court should dispose of a case on non-constitutional grounds rather than constitutional grounds if possible. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297
U.S. 288, 347 (1936).
As the following analysis will demonstrate, CERCLA
does operate retroactively in this case. However, despite that
fact that statutes are presumed to not apply retroactively,
this effect was specifically intended by Congress. Furthermore, imposing liability in this case does not offend Due
Process.
A. What is the proper test to determine if a statute may
be applied retroactively?
The Supreme Court has had many opportunities to discuss when and whether to apply a law retroactively to conduct taking place before the effective date. See e.g. Landgraf
v. USI Film Products, 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994) (deciding that
an amendment to the Civil Rights Act which took effect after
a trial court judgment but before appellate review and created a right to recover compensatory damages could not be
applied to the case on appeal); Thorpe v. Housing Authority
of City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969) (holding that an
agency requirement mandating certain particular notice
prior to an eviction from a public housing project could be ap-
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plied to an eviction notice issued before the requirement was
adopted); Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S.
204 (1988) (deciding that a retroactive application of a wageindex rule for a hospital treating Medicare patients was improper); Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, 416
U.S. 696 (1974) (holding that an amendment providing for
the awarding of reasonable attorney fees to prevailing party
could be applied to fees incurred before enactment); Usery v.
Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding that
requiring former employer to pay Black Lung benefits to former employee is not a violation of Due Process even though
the employment was terminated prior to passage of the authorizing statute). Although the Supreme Court has not yet
considered whether CERCLA should be applied retroactively,
other federal courts have squarely addressed this issue. See
e.g. United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); Nevada v. United
States, 925 F. Supp. 691 (D. Nev. 1996); United States v.
Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985); United
States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 653 F.
Supp. 984 (D.S.C. 1984); Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562
F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983). The only decision which has
refused to apply CERCLA because the application would be
retroactive is United States v. Olin, 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1507
(S.D. Ala. 1996).
Although all of the cases dealing with CERCLA, except
for Olin, have reached the same result, there has been some
confusion about the proper test to apply to determine if a retroactive application of a statute is permissible. The confusion
results from somewhat contradictory Supreme Court precedent. One the one hand, the Supreme Court has stated that
[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law." See Bowen, 488
U.S. 204, 208 (1988). However, the Supreme Court has also
asserted that "a court is to apply the law in effect at the time
it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary." See Bradley, 416 U.S. at 711; Thorpe,
393 U.S. at 281. In Ohio ex rel Brown v. Georgeoff, the court
considered the possibility that Thorpe and Bradley modified
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the rule stated in Bowen. See 562 F. Supp. at 1308 n.9. In
fact, the Supreme Court itself indicated in Landgraf v. USI
Film Products, 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994), that there is some
"tension" between the statements made in Bowen, Bradley,
and Thorpe. See 114 S. Ct. at 1496. While Landgraf attempted to reconcile those three cases and reaffirmed their
holdings, see 114 S. Ct. at 1523 (Scalia, J. concurring), the
Court also, stated that "under either view, where congressional intent is clear, it governs." Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at
1496.
Pre-Landgrafcases involving CERCLA have applied a
three-part test to resolve the retroactivity dilemma. See Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1302. Under this test, the court first
looks to see if the complaint seeks a retroactive application of
the law. See id. If so, then the court applies the presumption
against retroactivity. See id. In order to rebut the presumption, the court examines the statutory language and, if necessary, the legislative history to determine if Congress has
evinced a clear intent that the statute be applied retroactively. See id.
The Supreme Court in Landgrafset forth a four part test
which is quite similar to the Georgeoff test. Under Landgraf,
the first question to be answered is whether the legislature
"has expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach." 114 S.
Ct. at 1505. If not, the next step is to ascertain whether applying the statute in the case at bar would result in a retroactive application. See id. If so, the court presumes that
Congress did not intend such a result. See id. Finally, the
court undertakes to determine if Congress clearly intended a
retroactive application. See id.
The Olin court, citing the fact that Georgeoffwas decided
prior to Landgraf,dismisses the entire Georgeoff analysis and
sets forth its own interpretation of the proper test. The Olin
test also consists of three steps. Under the Olin method, a
court begins its analysis by determining whether Congress
has expressly stated, either in the text of the statute or its
legislative history, if the law is to be applied retroactively.
See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1511. If not, the court must then
decide if the statute has a retroactive effect under the partic-
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ular facts of the case. See id. If such an effect is present, the
court must "apply the traditional presumption against retroactivity - absent a clear congressional intent to the contrary."
Id.
The only other post-Landgrafcase addressing CERCLA
retroactivity has stated that Landgrafdid not affect the rules
set out in Bowen, Thorpe, and Bradley, but merely reconciled
those decisions. See Nevada v. United States. 925 F. Supp. at
693. In Nevada v. United States, the district court adopted
the findings and conclusions of a Magistrate, including the
statement that "as Landgraf makes clear, the general presumption against retrospective application of statutes remains unless the new statute simply affects procedure
(Thorpe) or matters secondary to the principal cause of action
(Bradley)." See 925 F. Supp. at 696, 698. The Magistrate
went on to note that, in order to apply CERCLA retroactively,
there must be "clearcongressionalintent" that retroactive application is proper. See 925 F. Supp. at 702 (noting that an
express retroactivity provision is unnecessary to meet the intent requirements of Landgraf).
Considering the authorities discussed above, it is clear
that there is indeed a three-part test to be used in determining whether a statute may be applied to conduct occurring
before enactment. However, the Olin court mistakenly concludes that the test has changed over the past twenty-seven
years since the Thorpe decision. On the contrary, Landgraf
made clear that the Supreme Court's prior decisions are all
consistent with one another. Thus, the Olin court's summary
disposal of the Georgeoff case as inapplicable in light of the
Landgraf opinion was unwarranted. In fact, the Georgeoff
test is effectively the same test pronounced by the Landgraf
court. The only difference between the two tests is that the
Georgeoff test presumes a lack of express statutory language
stating that the provisions of the law apply retroactively
while Landgraf lists this finding as its first step. Furthermore, the Landgraf test combines the application of the presumption with the examination of evidence which may rebut
the presumption. Georgeoff lists these two requirements as
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separate steps. The substantive analyses undertaken by the
courts are, however, identical.
Therefore, in order to determine whether CERCLA liability attaches to contamination caused by pre-enactment conduct in the absence of express language sanctioning such a
result, the court must apply a three-part test. The court
must determine if the statute must be applied retroactively.
If so, the presumption against retroactive application is invoked. In order to rebut this presumption, it must be shown,
either in the language of the statute, the legislative history,
or both, that Congress clearly intended a retroactive application of CERCLA.
B.

Application of the three-part test
1.

Is a retroactive application of the statute required?

Before the court begins determining if a statute may be
applied retroactively, it must first discern whether such an
application is even necessary. This determination presupposes an understanding of what makes a statute retroactive.
Courts have understood that a retroactive effect is "one which
'... creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches
a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations
already past ... .'" Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1303 (citing
Justice Story in Society for Propagating the Gospel v.
Wheeler, 22 F.Cas. 756 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814)). "A statute does
not operate retroactively merely because it is applied in a
case arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment
...or upsets expectations based on prior law." Landgraf,114
S. Ct. at 1499. The court must determine if conduct occurring
prior to enactment now forms the basis of a new type of liability. See id.
An example of the type of relief that is undoubtedly retroactive is compensatory damages. See Landgraf, 114 S. Ct.
at 1506 ("compensatory damages are quintessentially backward-looking"). This is because such damages are, in the
case of private parties, paid out the pocket of the defendant,
rather than from the public fisc. See id. Even if a party was
entitled to some relief prior to the enactment of a statute, the
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addition of a new form of relief, such as a cause of action for
compensatory damages in addition to backpay, may constitute retroactive application of a statute if the conduct causing
the harm occurred entirely before compensatory damage
claims were authorized. See 114 S. Ct. at 1506-07.
The Olin court makes an analogy to compensatory damages regarding CERCLA. The court proposes that CERCLA
costs fall somewhere between compensatory damages and punitive damages since, in addition to having to pay cleanup
costs, a party could be fined for failing to obey an EPA order
or be subject to treble damages under § 107(c). See 927 F.
Supp. at 1517. With respect to the fines and punitive damages, the court notes that Landgrafindicated that imposing
punitive damages retroactively involves a constitutional ex
post facto concern. See id.
In the past, the government has attempted to argue that
CERCLA is not retroactive even if the conduct which caused
the contamination occurred wholly before the enactment
date. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1513. In Georgeoff, the Justice Department (Justice) argued that CERCLA is not being
applied retroactively even if the conduct occurred before enactment because the condition causing the liability was a
"continuing release" that persisted after CERCLA was enacted. See Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1303. The court rejected Justice's argument, ruling that there must be some
post-enactment conduct on the defendants' part in order to
consider non-retroactive application of CERCLA. 562 F.
Supp. at 1304. The court went on the say that because there
was no "control or use of the Dump by [the defendants] after
the December 1980 passage of CERCLA," 562 F. Supp. at
1305, CERCLA was being applied retroactively. See id. The
Olin case illustrates that Justice has abandoned its "continuing release" argument in light of the overwhelming judicial
authority that permitted CERCLA liability to be imposed retroactively. See 927 F. Supp. at 1508 ("The Justice Department has responded somewhat cavalierly to the issue of
CERCLA's retroactivity, contending the matter is 'well-settled' and unaffected by Landgraf.").
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It seems clear from the definition of retroactivity and the
abandonment of Justice's "continuing release" argument that
CERCLA is being applied retroactively when liability is premised upon conduct which occurred wholly before the
enactment date. CERCLA creates a new duty with respect to
disposal actions taken prior to enactment. That new duty is
to either voluntarily clean up the contamination or face a possible cost recovery action by the government or a private
party.
Furthermore, a cost recovery action is very similar to a
claim for compensatory damages. A clean-up undertaken by
the government or a private party results in a cost to that
party. When the responding party sues for recovery of its
costs, it is seeking compensation from the entity responsible
for the contamination. Olin makes this analogy rather
clearly.
Although WUWPS and SNUHSA claim that there is no
retroactive application here since the costs were incurred after enactment, the fact is that the conduct which caused the
expenditure of response costs took place prior to the passage
of CERCLA. The definitions of retroactivity seem to speak to
the conduct of the defendant, not when the plaintiff incurred
a monetary loss. Furthermore, Landgraf teaches that the
court must consider the conduct which forms the basis for the
liability. Although GUVS is being sued by WUWPS, the EPA
could have just as easily ordered GUVS to clean up. Such an
order would be based on GUVS's pre-enactment disposal.
In the present case, both SUPS and GUVS engaged in
on-site disposal prior to the enactment of CERCLA. In addition, the sale of the site to WUWPS was effected on September 30, 1980, over two months before CERCLA was enacted.
Nothing in the facts indicates that either SUPS or GUVS had
any contact with the site after the sale to WUWPS. Furthermore, since WUWPS took its waste to an off-site disposal facility, it appears that the chemicals were lying dormant until
the contamination was discovered in 1993. Therefore, application of CERCLA to GUVS in this case would clearly be an
imposition of retroactive liability subject to the requirements
of the three-part test discussed above.
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Application of the presumption

Once it is determined that a plaintiff seeks to apply a
statute retroactively in the absence of express authority to do
so, it is generally presumed that Congress did not intend the
statute to operate retroactively. See Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at
1505. The presumption serves to assure that Congress will
not seek to appease its constituents by passing retroactive
laws that unfairly impose liability on "unpopular groups or
individuals." See 114 S. Ct. at 1497. By requiring clear intent of retroactive effect, the court is merely checking to see if
Congress has weighed the benefits of retroactivity against the
burdens to be imposed on potential defendants. See 114 S.
Ct. at 1501.
Some statutes are immune to this presumption. For instance, statutes "conferring or ousting jurisdiction" have been
applied retroactively as have laws effecting procedural
changes. See Landgraf,114 S.Ct. at 1501-02. The Georgeoff
court also states that "remedial statutes have always been excepted from this [presumption] and have been applied retroactively." 562 F. Supp. at 1306 n.7. The court then noted
that "'[a] remedial statute is generally defined as one which
neither enlarges nor impairs substantive rights, but rather
relates to the means and procedure for enforcing those
rights."' Id. (quoting Bagsarianv. Parker Metal Co., 282 F.
Supp. 766, 769-70 (N.D. Ohio 1968)). Despite this definition,
some courts, in justifying a broad interpretation, have stated
that CERCLA is a remedial statute, though not in the context
of a retroactivity analysis. See e.g. Catellus Development
Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting the remedial nature of CERCLA when considering the
scope wastes covered under the statute); United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726,
743 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that imposition of strict liability
comports with CERCLA's broad remedial purpose).
In this case, the presumption against retroactivity appears to apply to the imposition of CERCLA liability on
GUVS. CERCLA is not merely jurisdictional or procedural.
Rather, CERCLA creates a potentially heavy liability burden
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based on conduct which may have been permissible, even
commonplace, prior to enactment. The fact that CERCLA
has been characterized as a "remedial" statute does not seem
to be consistent with the definition of a remedial statute as
that definition has been invoked with respect to retroactive
applications. Moreover, the LandgrafCourt declined to mention remedial statutes as being exempt from this presumption against retroactivity. Therefore, the most prudent
course of action for the court to take is to apply the presumption against retroactivity and search the statute and legislative history for enough evidence to rebut the presumption.
3.

Has Congress effectively rebutted the presumption?
a.

Language of the statute

The presumption against retroactive application of a
statute may be rebutted by clear evidence of congressional intent. See Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1505 ("If the statute would
operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches
that it does not govern absent clear congressional intent
favoring such a result."). The court in Nevada v. United
States, 925 F. Supp. 691 (D. Nev. 1996), clarified this statement by noting that clear congressional intent "does not require a clear statement of congressional intent." Id. at 693.
The first place to look for evidence of congressional intent is
the language of the statute itself. See Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp.
at 1309. The legislative history should be consulted only if
the statutory provisions do not adequately resolve the issue.
See id.
There are several sections of CERCLA that may be of
assistance in determining whether Congress intended CERCLA to have a retroactive effect. The most obvious place to
start may seem to be the effective date. President Carter
signed CERCLA into law on December 11, 1980. See Frank
P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
("Superfund") of 1980, 8 Colum. J. Envt'l L. 1, 35 (1982).
CERCLA § 302(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9652(a), states that "[u]nless
otherwise provided, all provisions of this chapter shall be ef-
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fective on December 11, 1980." Id. The Supreme Court asserted in Landgraf that such a provision "does not even
arguably suggest that it has any application to conduct that
occurred at an earlier date." 114 S. Ct. at 1493. However,
other courts have noted that CERCLA's enactment date was
merely inserted as a reference for ascertaining when certain
regulations had to be passed and to dictate when an action
may be brought under the statute. See United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726,
733 (8th Cir. 1986).
Another provision which may be used as evidence of congressional intent is § 107, the liability provision. Section
107(f) specifically states that "[t]here shall be no recovery
under the authority of subparagraph (C) of subsection (a)
[dealing with PRP liability for natural resource damages] of
this section where such damages and the release of a hazardous substance from which such damages resulted have occurred wholly before December 11, 1980." CERCLA
§ 107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1). Sections 107(a)(1)(A), (B),
and (D) dealing with recovery of response costs are not so limited. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)(A), (B), and (D). In addition,
§ 111(d) prohibits the use of Superfind monies to remedy
natural resources damages where the damage occurred prior
to enactment. See 42 U.S.C. 9611(d). Some court have accepted the proposition that this negative 9611(d). Some court
have accepted the proposition that this negative implication
is strong evidence that Congress intended retroactive application of CERCLA with regard to response costs but not natural resources damages. See e.g. Nevada v. United States, 925
F. Supp. at 702; United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp.
at 1076-77. With respect to the difference in treatment of
cleanup costs and natural resources damages, the District of
Colorado noted that, since CERCLA's main purpose is to
avoid further deterioration of contaminated sites rather than
to compensate individuals for completed harms, it made
sense to apply CERCLA retroactively to cleanups and not to
actions for natural resources damages. See United States v.
Shell Oil Co, 605 F. Supp. at 1076.
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The LandgrafCourt encountered a negative implication
argument similar to the one proffered in CERCLA cases.
Landgrafinvolved statutory language to the effect that "unless otherwise provided" the act would take effect "upon enactment." See 114 S. Ct. at 1493. Both the petitioner and the
Court agreed that the "unless otherwise provided" language
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 referred to a section dealing
with a specific disparate impact case and a section dealing
with overseas employers. See 114 S. Ct. at 1493, 1494. The
petitioner argued that this statutory set-up indicated that all
other sections not specifically stating when they were effective could be applied retroactively. See id. The Court rejected this reading of the statute because "it would be
surprising for Congress to have chosen to resolve that question [of retroactivity] through negative inferences drawn from
two provisions of quite limited effect." 114 S. Ct. 1493-94.
The Olin court decided that the "negative implication"
argument was totally rejected by the Supreme Court in Landgraf. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1509 n.36. Thus, the court
refused to consider the inclusion of specific prospective language regarding natural resources as evidence that Congress
intended retroactive applicability for cleanup costs. See id.
Other language in the statute also provides some guidance. For instance, § 103(c) requires that "any person who
owns or operates or who at the time of disposal owned or operated, or who accepted hazardous substances for transport
and selected[ ] a facility at which hazardous substances ...
are or have been stored, treated, or disposed of [without a
permit or interim status]" notify EPA of "the existence of the
facility, specifying the amount and type of hazardous substance[s] to be found there, and any known, suspected, or
likely releases .... ." 42 U.S.C. § 9603(c).
One final statutory source of information regarding the
retroactivity of CERCLA is the tense of the verbs used in
§ 107(a). In United States v. NortheasternPharmaceutical&
Chemical Co., the Eighth Circuit considered the fact that
Congress chose to impose liability on any person who "owned
or operated" a contaminated facility, "arranged" for transport, or "accepted" hazardous substances to be indicative of
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intent to apply CERCLA to actions wholly prior to enactment.
See 810 F.2d at 733. Other courts have specifically rejected
this argument. See e.g. Nevada v. United States, 925 F.
Supp. at 699 (stating that "[gliven the especially amorphous
legislative development of this section, this Court agrees that
comparing verb tenses within the statutory sections does little to advance the retroactivity analysis").
In spite of cases like Nevada v. United States, courts
should not be so quick to dismiss the use of the past tense.
CERCLA was passed, in part, to address contamination resulting from inactive sites. See H. Rep. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at
1 (1980) (noting that the purpose of CERCLA was to "provide
authorities to respond to releases of hazardous waste from inactive, hazardous waste sites which endanger public health
and the environment ... [and] to provide for the liability of
persons responsible for releases of hazardous waste at such
sites"); see also Grad, supra, at 2. This consideration gives
the past tense argument some merit. It does not appear that
Congress intended to reach "inactive" sites that had been
dumped on the day after enactment, but not those that had
been dumped on for the last time the day before enactment.
All of the above-mentioned factors provide some fairly
substantial evidence that Congress meant for the statute to
have a retroactive effect. The fact that Congress specifically
refused to allow for retroactive application where natural resources damage occurred as a result of pre-enactment conduct is particularly persuasive, despite Olin's contention that
this argument has been rejected by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court specifically noted that the two provisions involved in the negative implication regarding the Civil Rights
Act were minor provisions. The natural resources recovery
authority is, on the other hand, a potentially major source of
liability under CERCLA § 107. Furthermore, it seems as
though the notification requirements of § 103(c) would lose
much of their purpose if Congress did not intend the information to be used to identify contaminated sites and potentially
responsible parties. Because notification is necessary only
six months after enactment, it is logical to conclude that
CERCLA would apply to conduct before enactment.
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In sum, the statutory provisions provide fairly strong evidence that Congress intended to reach conduct which occurred before December 11, 1980 when it passed CERCLA.
However, a court may not find a clear intent emerging from
the above discussion. Therefore, it is necessary to turn to the
legislative history for additional guidance. See Georgeoff, 562
F. Supp. at 1311.
b.

Legislative history

Although the Olin court found the legislative history to
be of no help, see 927 F. Supp. at 1515 (stating that "[tihe
most that can be said from the legislative history is that Congress left many questions, including retroactivity, as open
ones to be decided later"), other courts have found clear congressional intent among the pre-enactment documents. For
example, the court in Shell Oil noted that earlier Senate
amendments to the bill explicitly permitted recovery of preenactment response costs. See 605 F. Supp. at 1078.
Although this amendment was never adopted, the court
noted that its main effect is present in the limitation on recovery of natural resources damages. See 605 F. Supp. at
1079. Furthermore, the Nevada court pointed out that the
House and the Senate used the failure of existing statutes
regulating hazardous waste to deal with "abandoned and inactive hazardous waste sites" and the policy against having
the public pay for the cleanup as the reason for enacting
CERCLA. See 925 F. Supp. at 703, 704.
The Georgeoff court provided a few examples of legislative history which may shed some light on the retroactivity
issue. First, the court noted that the legislative history demonstrates that Congress specifically included "inactive" hazardous waste sites within the scope of CERCLA. See 562 F.
Supp. at 1311. Finally, the Georgeoff decision looked to the
fact that lawsuits involving contamination resulting from
pre-enactment conduct would be necessary to avoid depleting
the Superfund too rapidly as evidence that Congress meant to
apply CERCLA retroactively. See 562 F. Supp. at 1313. Georgeoff also relied on numerous statements from members of
Congress which indicated that sites that were contaminated
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prior to enactment were to be cleaned up using industry as
the funding source. See 562 F. Supp. at 1312. It may also be
noted that an early House version of CERCLA, H.R. 7020,
originally contained a statement that the statute was to apply retroactively. However, the final version of CERCLA, the
language of which came principally from the Senate, see e.g.
United States v. Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1077, did not contain this provision. See id.
In sum, the court should conclude that a retroactive application of CERCLA in this case is not only requested, but is
also properly authorized by Congress. Taken in conjunction
with the language of the statute, the legislative history supports a finding that Congress clearly intended a retroactive
application of CERCLA where contamination resulted from
pre-enactment conduct. Although Congress could have made
its aim easier to discern, given the fact that it was written
and passed quickly, this lack of clarity is not surprising. Retroactive application of CERCLA was a consideration, however, and it appears Congress intended this result with
respect to costs incurred cleaning up pre-enactment
contamination.
C.

Due Process Concerns

Even if it is clear that Congress intended a statute to
have retroactive effect, the application of the statute cannot
violate the defendant's rights under the Due Process clause of
the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment states that a
person shall not "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
"Legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of
economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality, and [ I the burden is on the one complaining of a
due process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational manner." Usery v. Turner
Elkhorn Mining Co. 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976). Even if a statute
operates retroactively, that retroactive effect does not necessarily offend due process. See id. at 16. In order to pass constitutional muster, the statute merely need be "rationally
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related to a valid constitutional purpose." See United States
v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 563 F. Supp.
984, 997 (D.S.C. 1984).
At least two courts have squarely addressed whether a
retroactive application of CERCLA violates due process. In
United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc.,
the court held that CERCLA satisfied the rational basis requirements set out by the Supreme Court in TurnerElkhorn.
First, the court noted that CERCLA's purpose was to deal
with the environmental dangers posed by inactive hazardous
waste sites. See 563 F. Supp. at 997-98. Second, the court
pointed to the fact that the legislature intended the primary
financial burden of cleaning up these sites to be borne by the
parties responsible for the contamination. See 563 F. Supp.
at 998. Finally, the court concluded that CERCLA's scheme
represents a rational method of achieving the goals developed
by the legislature. See id. In reaching its conclusion, the
court was conscious of the fact that it is not a function of the
judiciary to second guess whether the legislature passed the
best statute to address the problem, but only whether the
statute was constitutional. See id. A similar result was
reached by the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical& Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir.
1986).
The reasoning of the South Carolina and Northeastern
Pharmaceuticalcourts is sound. The rational basis test is a
fairly easy one to meet. While the parties may not have anticipated the exact liability incurred under CERCLA, it is
reasonable to expect to have to compensate another for injuries caused by one's actions. While Congress could have paid
for the cleanups through a new tax imposed on everyone, it is
not for a court to determine if Congress chose the best method
possible; any permissible method passes the test set out by
the Supreme Court in Turner Elkhorn.
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DOES APPLYING CERCLA IN THIS CASE
VIOLATE THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION?

The second issue to be considered by the court is whether
applying CERCLA to the facts in this case exceeds Congress's
authority under the Commerce Clause, particularly in light of
the recent Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Lopez,
115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) and Seminole Tribe of Floridav. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996). The court should probably conclude that applying CERCLA here is constitutional since the
activity at issue is an economic activity regulated as part of a
comprehensive scheme of regulation of hazardous waste. The
fact that the contamination here did not and likely never will
not cross state lines does not require a different result. The
Lopez decision did not signify a change in Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, which permits incident regulation of local activities substantially affecting interstate commerce if taken
in the aggregate. Instead, Lopez reaffirmed the Court's prior
cases and merely refused to allow further expansion of its interpretation of the Constitution. Finally, since GUVS is not
an instrumentality of the State of New Union, the sovereign
immunity issues raised in the Seminole case are not present
here.
A.

May Congress require an entity to remediate a site
under CERCLA where the contamination allegedly
caused by that entity is purely local in its effects?

The United States Constitution grants to Congress the
power to "regulate Commerce . . . among the several states
...." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Over the years, courts
have struggled over how to interpret this particular grant of
power. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634 (Kennedy, J. concurring). Prior to 1937, Congress's commerce power was restricted to regulation of only activities which were directly
related to interstate commerce. See Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1628.
However, the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v.Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), broadened the power
substantially when it held that intrastate activities which
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"'have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect
that commerce from burdens and obstructions' are within
Congress' power to regulate." Lopez, 115 S.Ct at 1628 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37). Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that "[1]egislative Acts
adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to
the Court with a presumption of constitutionality . .. ."

Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
A few years after establishing the new standard by which
to judge laws enacted by Congress pursuant to its Commerce
Clause authority, the Court clarified the true reach of the
Jones & Laughlin test in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942). In Wickard, a farmer had set aside, for his own personal consumption, a portion of his wheat crop. See 317 U.S.
114. When the Secretary of Agriculture attempted to penalize the farmer for exceeding an assigned quota limiting the
amount of wheat he could grow, the farmer countered that
the law was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's commerce power. See 317 U.S. at 113-14. The substance of the
farmer's claim was that his use of the wheat amounted
merely to an indirect effect on commerce because his activities had only local effects. See 317 U.S. at 119.
The Wickard Court rejected the farmer's attempts to distinguish between direct and indirect effects on interstate
commerce and between production or manufacture and sale
of goods. See 317 U.S. at 119-20. Instead, the court explained that
even if... [the] activity is local and though it may not be

regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be
reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce and this is irrespective of
whether such effect is what might at some earlier time
have been defined as "direct" or "indirect."
317 U.S. at 125. Regarding the allegation that the farmer's
actions had only local effects, the Court replied that even
though the farmer's "contribution to the demand for wheat
may be trivial by itself, [that] is not enough to remove him
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from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly
situated, is far from trivial." 317 U.S. at 127-28. The Court
concluded its Commerce Clause discussion by noting that
with the "wisdom, workability, or fairness of the plan of regulation [the Court has] nothing to do." See 317 U.S. at 129.
In 1968, the Court responded to the concern that the
Wickard decision worked to justify any regulation of intrastate activities, no matter how little they impacted interstate
commerce. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, overruled on
other grounds, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976), overruled by, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In Maryland v.
Wirtz, the Court explained that "[n]either here nor in Wickard has the Court declared that Congress may use a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad
general regulation of state or private activities ...[however]

where a general regulatory scheme bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence" 392
U.S. at 197 n.3.
In 1995, the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez,
115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), reviewed the history of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence and categorized Congress's authority
into three broad areas. See 115 S.Ct. at 1627-30. According
to the Lopez Court, Congress may pass laws regulating "the
use of the channels of interstate commerce." See 115 S.Ct. at
1629 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971)).
"Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or
things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may
come only from intrastate activities." Id. Third, Congress
can legislate regarding "activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce." See 115 S.Ct. at 1629-30 (citing
Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37). With respect to this
last category, the Court held that the activity must "'substantially affect[ ]' interstate commerce." See 115 S.Ct. at 1630.
The statute at issue in the Lopez case was section 922(q)
of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 which criminalized
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possession of a gun in a defined school zone. See 115 S. Ct. at
1626. Following its discussion of areas within Congress's
commerce power to regulate, the Court concluded that the
challenged statutory provision did not regulate the channels
of interstate commerce or people or things in interstate commerce, but would have to be covered under the third category
to pass constitutional muster. See 115 S. Ct. at 1630. The
Court noted that most areas covered under this last category
were economic activities such as mining (Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S 254 (1981))
and home-grown wheat (Wickard v. Filburn, supra). 115 S.
Ct. at 1630 (noting that Wickard represented the outer
boundary of Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause). The Court decided that section 922(q) did not involve commerce in any way and was not "an essential part of
a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity
were regulated." See 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31. Thus, the Court
concluded that the statute could not be found constitutional
"under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise
out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which
viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce." See 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
The Lopez Court also found that the statute criminalizing possession of a gun in a school zone did not provide for a
"jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-bycase inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects
interstate commerce." See id. As an example of such a "jurisdictional element," the Court pointed to the statute at issue
in United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971). See 115 S. Ct.
at 1631. In Bass, the defendant was arrested under a statute
which criminalized the "recei[pt], possess[ion], or transport[ation] in interstate commerce.., any firearm" by certain
classes of persons. See 404 U.S. at 337. With regard to the
connection to interstate commerce, the Bass Court stated
that such a showing was required in each case since criminal
matters were traditionally within the realm of state regulation. See 404 U.S. at 349-50. The Bass Court gave as an example of a situation which would meet this requirement a
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case involving the receipt of a firearm which had "previously
traveled in interstate commerce." See 404 U.S. at 350. In the
final sentence of its opinion, the Bass Court closed with the
reminder that "consistent with our regard for the sensitive
relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction, our
reading preserves as an element of all the offenses a requirement suited to criminal jurisdiction alone." 404 U.S. at 351.
After noting the absence of a jurisdictional element that
the Bass Court required for criminal statutes, the Lopez
Court considered that there were no express legislative findings that the possession of guns in school zones affects interstate commerce. See 115 S. Ct. at 1631. The Court was
careful to caution that such findings were not necessary, but
would merely be helpful in cases where the connection to interstate commerce was not apparent. See 115 S. Ct. at 163132.
Turning to the specifics of the Gun-Free School Zones
Act, the Court considered the government's claims that possession of a gun in a school zone substantially affected interstate commerce through (1) an increase in insurance costs
and (2) a fear of crime that curbs travel and diminishes the
ability of the educational process to create productive citizens
who will stimulate the economy. See 115 S. Ct. at 1632. The
Lopez Court found that this type of analysis would place virtually no limit on Congress's powers because nearly everything could then somehow be connected to commerce. See id.
In the concluding paragraph of its analysis, the Lopez
Court addressed the current status of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. See 115 S. Ct. at 1634. The Court noted that,
although courts have become increasingly liberal in permitting Congress to regulate under the Commerce Clause, a further broadening of that power was inappropriate. See id.
The Southern District of Alabama recently had the
chance to consider whether the Supreme Court's opinion in
United States v. Lopez signaled a significant enough change
in Commerce Clause jurisprudence to sustain a finding that
the application of CERCLA in cases where there were no obvious effects on interstate commerce was unconstitutional.
See United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala.
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1996). In United States v. Olin Corp., the court held that
where contamination resulting from a release of hazardous
substances was so localized that it would not likely spread
beyond the boundaries of the defendant's property, the defendant was not subject to liability under CERCLA. See id.
The constitutionality of applying CERCLA in the Olin case
was not initially raised by the parties; rather, the court, sua
sponte required that the parties brief the issue before the
court would even consider approving a consent decree jointly
proposed by EPA and Olin Corp. See 927 F. Supp. at 1506-07.
The proposed consent decree addressing the contamination gave nearly unlimited power to EPA to supervise the
remediation. See id. at 1505. Olin claimed that it agreed to
this lopsided arrangement for purely business reasons, eager
to get the job completed. See id. Although the state's Department of Environmental Management sought to oversee the
cleanup, EPA declined to yield its authority. See id. When
the parties sought to have the consent decree entered, the
court requested a briefing of the issue of CERCLA's retroactive application and whether applying CERCLA in this case
violated the Commerce Clause. See 927 F. Supp. at 1507.
The court addressed the Commerce Clause question following its discussion of retroactive effects. After an overview
of Commerce Clause cases, the Olin court proceeded to analyze CERCLA in light of the Lopez decision. The court first
concluded that CERCLA liability fell under the third category
of Commerce Clause regulation, activities which affect interstate commerce. See 927 F. Supp. at 1531. With respect to
this category of regulation, the court concluded, however,
that the activity must not only substantially affect interstate
commerce, but that Lopez also required that the activity be
an economic activity. See 927 F. Supp. at 1532. The court
also found significant the fact that the Lopez Court did not
find that section 922(q) was a constitutional regulation of
things in interstate commerce or that the total effect of all
possessions of guns in school zones substantially affects interstate commerce. See id. Finally, without discussion, the Olin
court decided that Lopez also required a jurisdictional ele-
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ment for case-by-case consideration of the effect on interstate
commerce. See id.
With respect to the facts in its own case, the Olin court
found that none of the requirements of its test were met.
First, the court held that, since the plants at issue were not
operational anymore, there was no economic activity. See id.
Second, the court decided that the application of CERCLA in
this case was really an exercise of a "kind of national police
power rejected by Lopez." See 927 F. Supp. at 1533. Finally,
the court ruled that, even if the above requirements were
met, the lack of a jurisdictional element was fatal. See id.
At least one court has found the reasoning in Olin to be
completely erroneous. In United States v. NL Industries,Inc.,
936 F. Supp. 545 (S.D. Ill. 1996), the Southern District of Illinois critically analyzed the Olin court's opinion and concluded that CERCLA does not violate the Commerce Clause.
See 936 F. Supp. at 563. The NL Industries court found that
CERCLA did indeed regulate an economic activity since disposal of hazardous waste was part of a larger economic enterprise, such as the manufacture of goods. See 936 F. Supp. at
963. Furthermore, the court decided that CERCLA "establishes a comprehensive program establishing a mechanism
for responding to releases of hazardous waste and assessing
liability for such releases." See 936 F. Supp. at 557. Thus,
concluded the court, the application of CERCLA is not like
criminal liability under the Gun Free School Zone's Act. See
936 F. Supp. at 562-63.
The court in NL Industries also took exception to the
Olin court's finding that Lopez required a jurisdictional element for case-by-case analysis of effects on interstate commerce. See 936 F. Supp. at 560. Contrary to Olin's assertion,
the court reasoned that "had such a jurisdictional element
been required, the Lopez Court's inquiry regarding the legislative findings related to interstate commerce would have
been superfluous." Id. Furthermore, the NL Industries court
noted that one of the reasons Congress enacted CERCLA was
to combat "midnight dumping," which often involved dumping in other states. See 936 F. Supp. at 562.
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Overall, the NL Industries court concluded that CERCLA
did not violate the Commerce Clause and that Olin seriously
misconstrued the Lopez decision. In sum, the court found
that CERCLA was part of a comprehensive system to regulate hazardous waste resulting from economic activities and
that these activities had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.
Turning to the facts of the action filed by WUWPS
against GUVS, the first task is to ascertain the correct test
for evaluating Congress's attempt to regulate under the Commerce Clause, noting that an economic regulation is presumed to be constitutional. Lopez makes this test rather
clear. First, Congress can control the channels of interstate
commerce. Second, Congress may regulate people and things
in interstate commerce. Finally, Congress has the power to
pass legislation which regulates any activity which substantially affects interstate commerce, even though an individual
effect is minuscule and has only local ramifications. In this
latter situation, it is enough if all of the individual activities
together would have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.
Contrary to the Olin court's conclusion, the Supreme
Court has not stated that these activities must be economic
activities. The regulated activity can be covered as part of an
overall scheme of regulation; in fact, the Lopez Court indicated that it could have upheld section 922(q) of the Gun Free
School Zones Act on this basis. Furthermore, as pointed out
by the court in NL Industries, the disposal of hazardous
wastes is inherently economic. Under the Olin court's assertion that there is no economic activity since the plants are no
longer in use, there could be no liability where a company
dumps all of its hazardous waste in its backyard and abandons its facilities and the contamination is not discovered
before the abandonment. Under the same reasoning, the
farmer that consumes his wheat immediately after harvest
and then sells his farm cannot later be held liable for exceeding his quota. Such a result makes no sense.
As for the requirement of a jurisdictional element, the
NL Industries court correctly observes that such an inquiry is
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undertaken as an additional test if the connection to interstate commerce is unclear. The Bass Court made clear that
such a requirement is only necessary to find a criminal statute constitutional. CERCLA is a civil statute imposing only
monetary burdens. Hence, a jurisdictional element is not
needed to pass constitutional muster.
Finally, the fact that the contamination of the property
at 123 Laurel Street is purely local and GUVS's activities at'
the site had only local effects is not enough to render application of CERCLA unconstitutional. The Lopez Court specifically approved of cases such as Wickard v. Filburn where
purely local effects aggregated together affect interstate commerce. Regarding CERCLA, it cannot be said that only local
contamination does not substantially affect interstate commerce. If a small company which does no business in interstate commerce dumps hazardous substances on its property,
it is avoiding the substantial cost of disposing of those substances properly. Taken together, each such instance could
have a profound effect on interstate commerce when these
small businesses are able to offer their product or services at
a lower cost. Putting just a few of these businesses in each of
the fifty states could cause economic effects in the national
market.
B. Does the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida require a finding that GUVS may
not be sued by a private party under CERCLA?
Even if government is not exceeding its authority under
the Commerce Clause by imposing CERCLA liability when
contamination is purely local in scope and effect, the question
still remains whether GUVS, a state-chartered entity may be
sued under CERCLA following the Supreme Court's decision
in Seminole Tribe of Floridav. Florida,116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996)
which overturned a prior plurality decision permitting a state
to be sued under CERCLA by a private citizen. Although
GUVS has raised this issue, GUVS has also agreed that it is
not an agency of the State of New Union and that the State
could have chosen to make GUVS such an instrumentality.
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Therefore, the Seminole case is inapplicable to the current
situation.
In Seminole, a federal law requiring Indian tribes and
states to enter into compacts regarding gambling on Indian
lands was at issue. See 116 S. Ct. at 1119. The law permitted
an Indian tribe to sue a state which refused to bargain in
good faith to create a compact. See id. The Seminole Tribe
attempted to enter into a compact with the state of Florida,
and, when Florida refused to negotiate, brought a lawsuit
against the state. See 116 S. Ct. 1121. Florida argued that it
had sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and
could not be sued. See id.
The Court stated that in order for Congress to abrogate
the states' sovereign immunity, it must (1) make its intent
clear and (2) be exercising a valid power under the Constitution. See 116 S. Ct. at 1123. Given the plain language of the
statute authorizing suits by tribes against states, the Court
concluded that this first part of the test had been met. See
116 S. Ct. at 1124. With respect to the second part of the test,
the Court noted that the only time the Court had held the
Congress could abrogate sovereign immunity was under the
Fourteenth Amendment (Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445
(1976)) and the Interstate Commerce Clause (Pennsylvaniav.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)). See 116 S. Ct. at 1125.
The Seminole Tribe was asking the Court to add the Indian
Commerce Clause to the list of powers through which Congress could abrogate sovereign immunity. See id.
Rather than accepting the tribe's invitation to extend
Congress's abrogation power, the Court instead overruled the
plurality Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.. In Union Gas, the
Court had permitted a state to be sued under CERCLA by a
private party. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1
(1989). The Union Gas plurality reasoned that, since Congress was given a broad power under the Interstate Commerce Clause, then it followed that it could take away the
states' sovereign immunity in order to exercise that power.
See 491 U.S. at 19-20. The justification given for this finding
of congressional authority was that the states agreed to be
sued when they ratified the Constitution. See 491 U.S. at 20.
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In overturning Union Gas, the Seminole Court stated
that "[e]ven when the Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of
suits by private parties against unconsenting States." 116 S.
Ct. at 1131. Furthermore, the Court found that permitting
an abrogation of sovereign immunity under the Commerce
Clause would amount to an impermissible expansion of federal jurisdiction under Article III. See 116 S.Ct. at 1128.
In this case, however, the State of New Union is not being directly affected. There has been a legal opinion that
GUVS is not an arm of the State of New Union and that the
State could have created such an institution but chose not to.
Therefore, the Seminole case has no direct bearing on this
case. Moreover, the fact that New Union could have made
GUVS a state agency but chose not to indicates that New
Union did not wish to provide GUVS with any immunity from
litigation. Finally, although GUVS argues that Seminole implies that a court should think twice before allowing an entity
chartered by a state to be sued, the Court did not appear to
extend its ruling beyond an actual governmental entity.
III. MAY WUWPS, A PRP, BRING A COST
RECOVERY ACTION OR IS IT LIMITED TO A
CONTRIBUTION ACTION?
The third issue to be considered by the court is whether
WUWPS, a potentially responsible party (PRP) under CERCLA by virtue of its ownership of contaminated property,
may bring a costs recovery action under CERCLA § 107
against GUVS, the former owner of the land and another
PRP, for expenses incurred in responding to the contamination or whether GUVS is limited to a contribution claim
under CERCLA § 113(f). Specifically, the court must decide if
a PRP may avail itself of CERCLA § 107(a) when that section
permits "any other person" (besides a federal, state, or local
governmental entity) who has incurred response costs to
bring a cost recovery action.
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Resolution of this issue will determine whether WUWPS
can impose joint and several liability on GUVS, thereby allocating to GUVS total liability for the orphan shares created
by bankrupt SUPS. If the claim is determined to be solely a
§ 107 claim, § 107(a) seems to provide WUWPS with full recovery since no mention is made of diminishment of recovery
due to plaintiffs liability. As discussed below, this argument
has not been generally accepted. If the claim is found to be
purely a § 113 claim, § 113(f) provides for equitable allocation
of costs, including orphan shares, among all liable parties.
Finally, if the claim involves both § 107 and § 113, the orphan
shares can be attributed to the plaintiff and defendant PRPs
or just the defendant PRPs. Thus, the real problem is
whether the plaintiff PRP can escape liability for orphan
shares by voluntarily cleaning up and then suing the other
PRPs.
It is important to note that WUWPS voluntarily initiated
a cleanup of the contaminated site, has not been ordered by
the EPA or any other governmental entity to perform any
cleanup action, and has not been formally adjudged to be liable under CERCLA. WUWPS would be a PRP solely by virtue of the fact that it is the current owner of the
contaminated property. GUVS, on the other hand, contributed to the contamination by dumping the hazardous chemicals in a ditch on the land it formerly owned.
A.

Is the CERCLA § 107 language clear and unambiguous
on its face and when read in context with the
contribution provisions of § 113?

The Supreme Court has never actually decided whether
a PRP can bring a cost recovery action under CERCLA § 107.
Cf Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 926 F.
Supp. 1400 (D. Ariz. 1996). However, the Court has indicated
in dicta that CERCLA § 107 and CERCLA § 113 both provide
remedies for a PRP. See Key Tronic Corp. v. United States,
114 S. Ct. 1960, 1966 (1994). In Key Tronic, the petitioner
brought an action for contribution to recover part of its payment to EPA in settlement of EPA's § 107 claims for recovery
of remedial costs incurred at a contaminated site. See 114 S.
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Ct at 1963. In addition, the petitioner also brought a cost recovery action for funds it had expended prior to the settlement. Id. The cost recovery claims included requests for
recovery of attorney fees and litigation costs. Id. The main
issue in the case was whether attorney fees were recoverable
under CERCLA, see 114 S. Ct at 1964, but the court outlined
the history of the creation of private causes of action under
CERCLA as part of its decision. See 114 S. Ct. at 1965-66. In
the course of this discussion, the Court observed:
[a]n amendment to § 107 itself, for example, refers to
'amounts recoverable in an action under this section.'...
The new contribution section also contains a reference to a
'civil action ... under section 107(a).'... Thus the statute
now expressly authorizes a cause of action for contribution
in § 113 and impliedly authorizes a similar and somewhat
overlapping remedy in § 107.
Id. (citations omitted).
The Court did not illuminate, however, on the extent of
the overlap of §§ 107 and 113. That question is presented
here.
The analysis of the issue must begin with an examination of the plain meaning of the statute. See Bailey v. United
States, 116 S. Ct. 501, 506 (1995). When the terms of a statute are not defined, they are to be given their ordinary meanings. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993).
Furthermore, if the statute is remedial in nature, then a
broad interpretation is called for to give effect to the remedial
purpose of the law. See Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 65
(1968). However, words do not exist in a vacuum; a statutory
provision must be examined in the context of the statute as a
whole and no section should be construed a way that would
render another section meaningless. See Richards v. United
States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962).
In wrestling with the issue of whether a PRP may sue
under § 107, four basic approaches to interpreting the language of CERCLA have been used. Courts have (1) looked to
the language of § 107(a)(4) in isolation, (2) examined
§ 107(a)(4) in combination with § 113(f), (3) placed priority on
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the language in § 113(f), and (4) analyzed the problem by attempting to reconcile the language in the statute of limitations provisions of § 113(g). While some courts adopt only
one of these approaches, others use two or more in
combination.
One case which used the first method and examined the
"any ... person" language of § 107(a)(4) in isolation was the
District of Arizona in Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining
Corp., 926 F. Supp. 1400 (D. Ariz. 1996). With regard to the
language of CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), the court stated that
"any other person" means "any other person" and the word
"innocent" should not be interposed between the words "any"
and "person," particularly since no such restriction appears
in reference to government plaintiffs granted standing to sue
under § 107(a)(4)(A) or with respect to any enumerated defenses. See 926 F. Supp. at 1405-06. This rationale is similar
to that employed by several other courts, such as Barmey
Aluminum Corp. v. Doug Brantley & Sons, Inc., 914 F. Supp.
159 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (noting that since remedial statutes are
to be construed broadly, PRPs should be permitted to sue
under § 107); Idyiwoods Assoc. v. Mader Capital,Inc., 915 F.
Supp. 1290 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); neumo Abex Corp. v. Bessemer
and Lake Erie R.R. Co., Inc., 921 F. Supp. 336 (E.D.Va. 1996)
(holding defendants jointly and severally liable for all but
plaintiffs share, including orphan shares); CharterTownship
of Oshtemo v. American Cyanamid Co., 910 F. Supp. 332
(W.D.Mich. 1995); and Companies for FairAllocation v. Axil
Corp., 853 F. Supp. 575 (D. Conn. 1994).
The second method of statutory analysis used to determine who has standing to sue under § 107 is to look at §§ 107
and 113 in combination to try to determine how those provisions relate to each other. There appears to be three schools
of thought in this respect. Some courts maintain that PRPs
may bring cost recovery actions under § 107 but remain subject to contribution claims by other PRPs. See Companies for
Fair Allocation v. Axil Corp., 853 F. Supp. 575, 580 (D. Conn.
1994). Another group holds that only "innocent parties" may
sue under § 107. These courts have varying definitions of the
term "innocent parties." See e.g. United Technologies Corp. v.
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Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 99 & n.8 (1st
Cir. 1994), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995) (generally, a
PRP is limited to contribution, however, "a PRP who spontaneously initiates a cleanup without governmental prodding
might be able to pursue an implied right of action for contribution under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)"); Akzo Coatings v. Aigner
Corp., 30 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994) (defendant limited to
contribution action under § 113 because it "is not, for example, a landowner forced to clean up hazardous materials that
a third party spilled onto its property or that migrated there
from adjacent lands"); Borough of Sayerville v. Union Carbide
Corp., 923 F. Supp. 671, 679 (D.N.J. 1996) ("response cost recovery action under section 107(a) is available only to an innocent party, a plaintiff who does not bear CERCLA liability).
Finally, one last group permits a PRP to sue under § 107 but
holds that the court itself must allocate costs on an equitable
basis as permitted under § 113. See e.g. Control Data Corp.
v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 1995) ("Recovery of
response costs by a private party under CERCLA is a twostep process); In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 951 F.2d 246, 249
(9th Cir. 1991). ("Initially, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant is a liable party under CERCLA. Once that is accomplished, the defendant's share of liability is apportioned in an
equitable manner."); Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d
664 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that "once liability is established,
the court must determine. . . which costs are recoverable...
[and] ascertain, under CERCLA's contribution provision,
each responsible party's equitable share of the cleanup
costs").
The third method of analyzing CERCLA to determine if a
PRP may bring a cost recovery action under § 107 is to give
the language of § 113 priority. Courts using this method reason that the plain legal meaning of the term "contribution" in
§ 113 stands for a suit brought by one liable party against
another liable party in order to equitably allocate the damages between the plaintiff and the defendant. See e.g. United
Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., 33
F.3d 96, 99 (1st Cir. 1996) (contribution action "refers to a
claim 'by and between jointly and severally liable parties for
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an appropriate division of payment one of them has been
compelled to make"'); United States v. Colorado & E. R.R.
Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536 (10th Cir. 1995) (when "both parties
are PRPs by virtue of their past or present ownership of the
site [ ], any claim that would reapportion costs between these
parties is the quintessential claim for contribution").
Finally, some courts have reviewed the statutes of limitations imposed by § 113 (g)(2)-(3) to determine if a PRP was
intended to have standing to sue under § 107. However, this
method has led to inconsistent results. For example, it may
be argued that if PRPs who voluntarily clean up are limited
to suing under § 113, there is no time limitation applicable to
their claim because the three-year period for § 113 runs from
the date of a judgment, order, or settlement, none of which
had occurred. See Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining
Corp., 926 F. Supp. 1400, 1406 (D. Ariz. 1996). On the other
hand, one might reason that permitting PRPs to use the sixyear statute of limitations for § 107 actions renders the threeyear period for contribution actions meaningless. See e.g.
United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d
96, 101 (1st Cir. 1994).
Despite several cases which adopt a more narrow approach, it is clear that a proper statutory analysis will involve
looking at the plain meaning of the words in §§ 107 and
113(f)-(g) and attempting to determine how those provisions
fit together harmoniously. It is possible to arrive at a solution where all the words are given their plain meanings and
no provisions are rendered superfluous. That solution involves permitting a PRP who initiates a clean-up to sue other
PRPs under § 107 and obtain joint and several liability, but
requiring a court, upon assertion of a counterclaim for contribution, to equitably allocate the costs not attributable to the
plaintiff PRP's actions among the defendants.
The above interpretation of the statute works best for
several reasons. First, it recognizes that a cost recovery action can be brought by "any . . . person" who incurred response costs, but preserves a defendant's right to seek
contribution from its co-defendants, other PRPs not sued by
the plaintiff, and the plaintiff itself. Thus, both § 107 and
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§ 113 have a purpose and one section is not eradicated by the
other. The plaintiff would utilize § 107 in an initial complaint and the defendant would use § 113 in a counterclaim,
cross claim, third party claim, or any combination of the
three. Second, the statutes of limitations are both effective.
The remediating plaintiff that actually incurred the clean-up
costs would have six years to sue other PRPs while those defendants who are sued would have three years from the date
of the judgment to search for other PRPs with whom to share
the burden. Finally, providing some protection to the PRP
who voluntarily cleans up provides an incentive for quick action by those responsible for the contamination. See e.g.
Pneumo Abex Corp. v. Bessemer & Lake Erie R.R. Co., 921 F.
Supp. 336, 347 (E.D.Va. 1996); Companies for Fair Allocation
v. Axil Corp., 853 F. Supp. 575, 579 (D. Conn. 1994).
B. Does the legislative history of CERCLA provide any
guidance as to Congress's intent in enacting § 107
and § 113?
If the language itself does not fully resolve an issue of
statutory interpretation, courts must look to legislative history for guidance. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896
(1984). Although the language of CERCLA §§ 107 and 113
can be reconciled to produce a harmonious result, the lack of
a clear mandate from Congress necessitates a check of the
legislative history to determine whether the legislature intended a specific result.
CERCLA was initially enacted in December 1980. See
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2808 (December 11, 1980). The purpose of CERCLA was to "provide
authorities to respond to releases of hazardous waste from inactive, hazardous waste sites which endanger public health
and the environment ...

[and] to provide for liability of per-

sons responsible for releases of hazardous waste at such
sites." H. Rep. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 1 (1980). Due to the
harshness of imposing joint and several liability on PRPs (a
PRP responsible for one percent of the contamination at a site
might end up liable for all the remedial costs incurred at that

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/12

46

19971

BENCH MEMORANDUM

861

site), courts implied a right to contribution under § 107 so
that liable parties might seek to shift some of the monetary
burden to other liable parties. See e.g. Pinal Creek Group v.
Newmont Mining Corp., 926 F. Supp. at 1404. In 1986, Congress included a contribution provision (CERCLA § 113) in
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
(SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as
amended in various sections of Title 42 of the United States
Code).
The legislative history of § 113 indicates an acceptance of
prior judicial attempts to resolve the § 107/§ 113 problem.
The House Energy and Commerce Committee stated that
§ 113 "clarifies and confirms the right of a person held jointly
and severally liable under CERCLA to seek contribution from
other potentially liable parties, when the person believes that
it has assumed a share of the cleanup or cost that may be
greater than its equitable share under the circumstances."
H.R. Rep. 99-253, pt. 1 at 79, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2835, 2861.
Generally, courts have not looked to the legislative history to ascertain whether a PRP may bring a cost recovery
action. Courts supporting such a cost recovery action have
found the wording of the statute to be dispositive and rely
little, if at all, on the legislative history. See e.g. Pinal Creek,
926 F. Supp. at 1405 (CERCLA "unequivocally grants standing to 'any ... person' who has incurred necessary response
costs . . ."). Likewise, courts finding no right of action for a
PRP under § 107 generally reason that the contribution provision speaks for itself and the plain meaning of "contribution" governs. See e.g. United States v. Colorado & E. R.R.
Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1535 (when "both parties are PRPs... any
claim that would reapportion costs .. .is the quintessential
claim for contribution"). However, at least one court turned
to the legislative history for additional support. See United
Technologies v. Browning-Ferris, 33 F.3d at 100 (noting that
"Congress, in enacting SARA, sought to codify case law . ..
and the cases decided to that point without exception, employed the legal term contribution in its traditional sense to
cover an action [between PRPs]").
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Although the cases have failed to rely on the legislative
history and have, instead, based their rulings upon the language of CERCLA, one might argue that the fact that courts
have reached varied results indicates that the language is unclear. Such disparate results may justify consideration of the
legislative history. Unfortunately, this history does little to
help the situation. On the one hand, the point made by the
United Technologies court that pre-SARA case law implied a
right to contribution and not cost recovery and that Congress
sanctioned this result in enacting § 113(f) as part of SARA is
persuasive. On the other hand, the fact that the legislative
history mentions contribution in the context of a person who
"has been held jointly and severally liable" indicates that a
PRP who has not had any liability formally imposed upon
him through an order or adjudication is not limited to contribution. The latter position, which is the situation in the present case, seems to be the best reading of the legislative
history.
In conclusion, the most natural reading of the statute
and its legislative history seems to indicate that a PRP, such
as WUWPS, which has not had any liability formally imposed
upon it, may bring a cost recovery action against another
PRP under § 107 of CERCLA. Regardless of whether the defendant PRP institutes a counterclaim for contribution, the
court should use its equitable powers to allocate to defendant
all those costs not specifically attributable to the actions of
the plaintiff. This interpretation of the statute gives effect to
both the cost recovery and contribution sections as well as
both the three-year and six-year statutes of limitation. Such
a result also comports with public policy by furthering the
aim of CERCLA to promote quick cleanup of contaminated
sites. See e.g. Pinal Creek, 926 F. Supp. 1407 (noting that
"this two-step framework satisfies both of CERCLA's goal: it
provides an array of incentives for private parties to initiate
prompt environmental cleanups; and it ensures that cleanup
costs will be equitably allocated among responsible parties").
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IV. MAY SNUHSA RECOVER ITS MEDICAL
MONITORING COSTS?
The fourth and final issue to be decided by the court is
whether SNUHSA may recover the costs it has incurred in
monitoring the Marinas for ill health effects resulting from
exposure to water and soil contaminated with photo processing chemicals. The key to the analysis is whether medical
monitoring costs are "response costs" within the meaning of
CERCLA.
A careful examination of the statutory language and legislative history reveals that medical monitoring costs are not
recoverable by any party when the monitoring was not approved by the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR). The provisions of § 104(i) related to the
ATSDR are comprehensive and specifically cover medical
monitoring. In light of the fact that the legislative history
indicates that CERCLA does not provide for recovery of personal injury expenses, it is logical to conclude that Congress
meant for medical monitoring to fall exclusively within the
realm of § 104(i). Furthermore, the scope of response costs,
as evidenced by the definitions of "removal" and "remedial action" indicates that only expenses incurred for cleaning up
are recoverable unless other costs are necessary to assess the
effect of the contamination on the public in general. Here,
the Marinas are the only people potentially affected since the
spread of the contamination was ascertained and the threat
eliminated.
A. Are medical monitoring costs "necessary costs of
response"?
The true issue is whether medical monitoring costs are
"necessary costs of response" recoverable under CERCLA
§ 107(a)(4)(B). Thus, the provision to be interpreted is the
definition of "response." As indicated above, a "response" is
either a "removal" or "remedial action" as those terms are defined in CERCLA. See CERCLA § 101(25). The definitions of
"removal" and "remedial action" set out specific examples of
the type of actions which properly fall within the statute,
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none of which refer to medical monitoring costs. But the definitions make clear that the lists are merely illustrative. See
CERCLA §§ 101(23), 101(24), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(23),
9601(24).
When faced with the task of interpreting a statute, the
court must begin with the language of the statute. See Bailey
v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501, 506 (1995). When a statute
contains words that are not explicitly defined, these words
are to be given their plain meaning. See Smith v. United
States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993). Furthermore, when a statutory provision or definition contains specific terms that have
a common theme, the other general terms in that list should
be interpreted consistent with that theme. See Beecham v.
United States, 114 S.Ct. 1669, 1671 (1994) (utilizing the doctrine of ejusdem generis).
Only two United States Courts of Appeals have actually
decided whether medical monitoring costs are "response
costs" which may be recovered under CERCLA and both have
denied recovery. See Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527,
1537 (10th Cir. 1992); Price v. United States Navy, 39 F.3d
1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 1994). InDaigle,the court undertook an
interpretation of the terms "response costs," "removal," and
"remedial action." The plaintiffs argued that medical monitoring costs met the portion of the definition of "remedial action" which included "any monitoring reasonably required to
assure that such actions protect the public health and welfare
and the environment." 972 F.2d at 1534 (quoting CERCLA
§ 101(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24)). In addition, the plaintiffs
claimed that medical monitoring costs fit the definition of removal as "the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public
health or welfare." 972 F.2d at 1534 (quoting CERCLA
§ 101(23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23)).
The Tenth Circuit held that inclusion of medical monitoring costs as a "removal" or "remedial action" expense would
give those terms a much broader interpretation than was
warranted by the language of the statute. 972 F.2d at 1535.
The court noted that the examples of removal and response
actions in the definitions related only to reducing the spread
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of contaminants, implying that any other action must be related to that purpose to qualify as a response action. See id.
The only other Court of Appeals to consider whether
medical monitoring costs fell under the definition of "removal" or "remedial action," Price v. United States Navy, 39
F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 1994), simply followed and adopted the
reasoning of the Daigle court. See 39 F.3d at 1017.
While a few district courts considered medical monitoring costs to be consistent with a "removal" or "remedial action," most courts which have undertaken the statutory
analysis set forth the same reasoning given by the Daigle
court. However, one court which determined that medical
monitoring costs are response costs is Jones v. Inmont Corp.,
584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984). In this case, the plaintiffs were owners of property adjacent to an illegal dump site.
584 F. Supp. at 1427. The complaint alleged that the plaintiffs had incurred costs for medical testing. See 584 F. Supp.
at 1429. With regard to the recovery of these medical testing
costs, the court stated that, "[t]hese damages appear to meet
the definition of 'removal' expressed in section 9601(23) .. .
[and] we cannot say as a matter of law that the plaintiffs are
not so entitled [to recover these costs]." 584 F. Supp. at 142930.
A post-SARA case which reached the same conclusion as
Jones was Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn.
1988). The Brewer court recognized that costs for medical
treatment are not recoverable under CERCLA, but stated
that "[t]o the extent that plaintiffs seek to recover the cost of
medical testing and screening to assess the effect of the release or discharge on public health or to identify potential
public health problems presented by the release, however,
they present a cognizable claim under section 9607(a)." 680
F. Supp. at 1179. The court asserted that "[p]ublic health related medical tests and screening clearly are necessary to
'monitor, assess, [or] evaluate a release' and therefore constitute 'removal' under section 9601(23)." 680 F. Supp. at 1179.
While there is authority on both sides of the issue, the
Court of Appeals cases clearly are more authoritative. In addition, the court may find persuasive the Daigle court's rea-
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soning that the terms in the definitions of "removal" and
"remedial action" contemplate only those actions which work
to physically contain the contamination and minimize its adverse effects. Since it has been stipulated that the Marinas
are the only people affected and the contamination has been
removed, the reasoning in Brewer is inapplicable to the current situation. In Brewer, the court specifically addressed
medical monitoring in the context of assessing damage to
public health. Here, that assessment has already been made
and the members of the Marina family are the only ones
affected.
B.

Does creation of the ATSDR support the recovery of
medical monitoring costs by SNUHSA?

In SARA, Congress created the ATSDR for the purpose of
examining the health effects of contamination at sites placed
on the National Priorities List (NPL) of contaminated sites
requiring cleanup. See Daigle v. Shell Oil, 972 F.2d 1527,
1536 (10th Cir. 1992). ATSDR actions are covered under section 104(i) of CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i). In addition to
ATSDR's statutory duty of conducting health assessments at
all NPL sites, CERCLA § 104(i)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(6),
persons who have been exposed to hazardous substances
through a release or probable release may petition the
ATSDR for a health assessment. CERCLA § 104(i)(6)(B), 42
U.S.C. § 9604(i)(6)(B). Such a petition may also be submitted
by the exposed person's physician. Id. If the petition is denied, the ATSDR must explain its denial in writing. Id. The
cost of conducting a health assessment is recoverable by the
ATSDR from PRPs under CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(D). Such
costs are also recoverable by the Superfund under CERCLA

§ 111.
The question here is whether a party can incur medical
monitoring costs without going through the ATSDR and then
recover these costs under § 107. The answer comes from an
analysis of the statute and, if necessary, the legislative history. Given the statutory provisions set out above, it appears
that Congress knew how to provide for medical monitoring
and deliberately chose not to cover such costs under § 107.
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A generally accepted rule of construction is that where
Congress expressly includes certain language in one section
of a statute, it is presumed that Congress meant to exclude a
similar provision in another section which is devoid of the
same or similar language. See Russello v. United States, 464
U.S. 16, 23 (1983). This rule was relied upon by the Tenth
Circuit in Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1536 (10th
Cir. 1992). In Daigle, the court noted that medical monitoring was specifically provided for in the establishment of the
ATSDR under SARA. 972 F.2d at 1536. Although plaintiff
argued that the medical monitoring authority of the ATSDR
is evidence that Congress meant to permit recovery of medical monitoring costs in a cost recovery action, the court rejected this assertion. Id. The court pointed directly to the
fact that CERCLA § 111 specifically provides that the
Superfund may recover for medical monitoring costs expended by the ATSDR. 972 F.2d at 1537. The court's conclusion was that the separate treatment of medical monitoring
costs under the ATSDR was evidence that, contrary to plaintiffs' contentions, Congress did not want to include medical
monitoring costs under the term "response costs." Id.
The Daigle court's conclusion was also reached by several
district courts. See Coburn v. Sun Chemical Corp., 1988 WL
120739 *5 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (Congress knew how to provide for
recovery of medical monitoring costs); Werlein v. United
States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 903-04 (D. Minn. 1990), vacated on
other grounds, 793 F. Supp. 898 (D. Minn. 1992); Ambrogi v.
Gould, 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1249 (M.D. Pa. 1990) (noting that a
person may petition for a health assessment by ATSDR). No
court has held that the provisions of CERCIA § 104(i) cut in
favor of permitting recovery of monitoring costs by any person or entity other that the agency or the Superfund.
It appears that SNUHSA will have a formidable task in
convincing a court that, when Congress gave the ATSDR the
power to perform health assessments on its own initiative or
on petition and provided that the agency may recover the corresponding costs under CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(D), Congress
also implied that such costs are recoverable by non-ATSDR
persons acting independently. The canons of construction

53

868

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

and the cases applying those canons clearly weigh against
such a finding.
C.

Does the legislative history support or oppose the
proposition that medical monitoring costs may be
recovered by SNUHSA?

If the statutory language is not dispositive of an issue, a
court should then turn to the legislative history for guidance
on the proper interpretation. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S.
886, 896 (1984).
Prior to the final passage of CERCLA, both the House of
Representatives and the Senate considered bills which contained provisions for the recovery of personal injury damages,
including medical expenses. See e.g. Daigle v. Shell Oil Corp.,
972 F.2d 1527, 1536 (10th Cir. 1992). An early House version
of CERCLA specifically stated that "costs" included "all damages for personal injury, injury to real and personal property,
and economic loss, resulting from [a] release or threatened
release." H.R. 7020, 96th Cong. § 3071(b)(2) (1980), reprinted
in 3 Envt'l L. Inst., Superfmd: A Legislative History, at 181
(1982) (as introduced by Rep. Florio on Apr. 2, 1980). However, this provision was not present in the bill as passed by
the House. See H.R. 7020, 96th Cong. § 3071(b)(2) (1980), reprinted in 3 Envt'l L. Inst., Superfund: A Legislative History,
at 50-51 (1982) (as passed by the House of Representatives).
Similarly, when Senator Randolph discussed the compromise
Senate bill he sponsored, he stated, "[wie have deleted the
Federal cause of action for medical expenses or income loss."
126 Cong. Rec. S14,964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980).
Several courts have considered this legislative history in
their analyses. See e.g. Daigle v. Shell Oil Corp., 972 F.2d
1527, 1535-36 (10th Cir. 1992); Coburn v. Sun Chemical
Corp., 1988 WL 120739 at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. 1988). In Daigle,
the court read the legislative history as barring recovery for
any costs that could be considered personal injury costs and
stated that "[p]laintiffs' request for medical monitoring to allow 'prevention or early detection and treatment of chronic
disease' smacks of a cause of action for damages resulting
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from personal injury." See 972 F.2d at 1535. In Coburn, the
court was not quite as harsh. The Coburn court thought that
the language in the statute was ambiguous, but also thought
that the legislative history was not dispositive on the issue
either. See 1988 WL 120739 at *3. However, at the time
Coburn was decided, there were no Court of Appeals cases
dealing with the issue.
Although several courts which denied recovery of medical monitoring costs looked into the legislative history, none
of the courts which have permitted the plaintiff to seek recovery of medical monitoring costs have even considered the legislative history in their analysis. Cf Williams v. Allied
Automotive, 704 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ohio 1988); Brewer v.
Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn. 1988); Jones v. Inmont
Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984). It appears that
the courts in those cases confined their inquiry to the wording
of the statute alone.
There is ample disagreement among the courts regarding
whether the statutory language is unclear, warranting an investigation of the legislative history. As stated above, courts
finding support for recovery of medical monitoring costs did
not even investigate the legislative history because they reasoned that the language of CERCLA clearly provided for recovery of such costs. Furthermore, the legislative history
itself does not directly address medical monitoring. Although
"personal injury" expenses are mentioned, it may be argued
that what SNUHSA seeks is not really personal injury expenses, but "monitoring" costs, which are mentioned in the
definition of removal. The question, then, to be decided by
the court is whether, given the fact SNUHSA has discovered
no medical harm to the Marinas, is the medical monitoring
the result of an personal injury. If such costs are personal
injury expenses, then the legislative history seems clear that
medical monitoring costs would not be recoverable. Given the
fact that the Marinas are the only people being monitored
and that the purpose of the monitoring is to detect and treat
any diseases or conditions which may result from the contamination, a court will be hard-pressed to find that expenses

55

870

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

SNUHSA seeks to recover do not amount to a personal injury
claim not authorized under CERCLA.
D. Does the analysis change at all due to the fact that
SNUHSA is a governmental entity which was not
personally injured by the contamination?
In all the cases heretofore mentioned, the plaintiff was a
private party directly injured by the contamination and seeking either recovery of medical monitoring costs incurred or
requesting the establishment of a medical monitoring fund to
cover future monitoring costs. However, in the instant case,
the plaintiff is a state agency which has incurred only economic loses since it has borne the cost of monitoring the
Marinas.
One district court which has permitted a claim for recovery of medical monitoring costs when the plaintiff is the government rather than a private party is United States v.
Ekotek, Inc., 1995 WL 580079 (D. Utah 1995). In Ekotek, the
EPA sought to recover its oversight costs, including medical
monitoring costs. See 1995 WL 580079 at *8. In order to permit the claim, the court distinguished the Daigle court's binding ruling which denied recovery of medical monitoring costs
by noting that the plaintiff here was the government and not
a private party. 1995 WL 580079 at *9. In support of its distinction, the court stated that "in the present case, the oversight costs were not incurred long after the threatened
release of contaminants, but were actively incurred by the
EPA during or closely in connection with the containment effort to restrict the public's exposure to the materials at the
Ekotek site." Id.
Although the Ekotek reasoning appears persuasive, there
are two important distinctions between the current case and
Ekotek. First, in Ekotek, the monitoring costs were incurred
as part of oversight activities by the EPA. Here, SNUHSA
undertook to monitor the Marinas on its own, separate from
any organized cleanup effort. Second, the contamination in
Ekotek was apparently more widespread and the EPA employed medical monitoring in the case of many persons.
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Here, there is only one family involved and the extent of the
contamination has been clearly defined. Any medical screening performed will not assist the government in determining
how far the contamination has actually spread, but will
merely serve to evaluate the extent of the Marina's personal
injuries, a result which has been shown to be inconsistent
with the language of CERCLA and its legislative history.
In conclusion, the language of CERCLA, while strongly
suggestive that medical monitoring costs are not recoverable,
is not totally dispositive. There is some room to argue that
medical monitoring, if undertaken for the benefit of a large
number of people at a time when the extent of contamination
is unknown, may be recoverable under CERCLA. However,
in this situation, where the threat has been abated and the
extent of the damage known, it is unlikely that the costs incurred by SNUHSA fall under the statutory provision of, for
example, "monitor[ing] . . . the release of hazardous sub-

stances under the definition of "removal." Furthermore, the
fact that either the Marinas or SNUHSA could have petitioned the ATSDR for monitoring also seems to preclude recovery of SNUHSA's costs. The legislative history does not
seem to come down in favor of SNUHSA's claim unless the
court accepts the argument that a claim for medical monitoring costs is not an action based on personal injury. Finally,
the fact that SNUHSA is a governmental entity does not
change the fact that medical monitoring costs must be "necessary costs of response" to be recoverable. Here, the facts
strongly indicate that the medical expenses have been and
will be incurred solely to identify the extent of the Marinas'
personal injuries resulting from the contamination and to respond quickly with appropriate medical treatment. Since the
costs cannot be said to have been incurred to monitor the release and its effect on the public health, it follows that
SNUHSA's claim must be denied.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the court should find that applying CERCLA to this particular case does not exceed Congress's pow-
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ers with regard to retroactive legislation or the Commerce
Clause even though the conduct which caused the contamination occurred before CERCLA was enacted and the actual effects do not extend beyond the State of New Union. Due
Process concerns do not require a different answer and
neither does the Seminole case.
In addition, since WUWPS did not contribute to the contamination and the plain language of CERCLA seems to indicate that a PRP can bring a cost recovery action, WUWPS
should be allowed to proceed under § 107 and have GUVS pay
for SUPS's orphan shares. GUVS should be able to sue
WUWPS for contribution and have WUWPS pay something
as the owner of the land.
Finally, SNUHSA should not be permitted to recover its
medical monitoring costs. CERCLA has in place a procedure
for obtaining the very testing that SNUHSA provided.
SNUHSA should not be able to circumvent that procedure.
The plain language of the statute and its legislative history
indicates Congress did not mean to provide for private parties
to recover such expenses.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss2/12

58

